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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Online Auctions are extremely popular. Once the domain of highly skilled negotiators, online auctions 
have made auctioning accessible to everyone, regardless of whom they are. A novice can buy everyday 
items such as groceries and clothes, or can compete for rarities and collectables such as rock memorabilia 
and antiques. Likewise, a seller has access to virtually a worldwide consumer base. It also seems that 
non-conventional items can be sold via online auctions, which would probably not be sold anywhere else! 
For example, auctions for the following items have been held: 
1. Mold on a sandwich that resembles the Virgin :MarYi 
2. A man willing to bang his head on a door until he is unconscious; and 
3. A French Fry shaped like the Nike logo. 
However, despite the overwhelming benefits and hype, there is a sinister and dark reality to auctioning 
online. Auction fraud is one of t.he fast.est growing forms of Internet-based crime. Participants are 
anonymous and can engage in undesirable and fraudulent behaviour in an attempt to gain an unfair 
advantage. For example, the seller may misrepresent or not deliver an item. .Likewise, a bidder can 
refuse to pay, or have his/her bid forged. Furthermore, the Auctioneer could block bids or influence the 
auction in a manner that maximises its revenue. Various cryptographic solutions have been proposed to 
fix many of these problems. However, most of these schemes are not suited to the auction style that is 
most commonly used online. 
Certain types of bidding behaviour can also be used to influence the auction in an undesirable manner. 
One such type of behaviour is shilling, where the seller introduces fake bids into the auction in order to 
inflate the price. Shilling is prohibiteel in online auctions, however, it still cont.inues to occur. Solutions to 
detect and/or prevent shill bidding tend to be outside the realm of cryptography. vVl1ile online auctioneers 
claim to monitor their auctions for bad behaviour, there are no published methods on how to detect shill 
bidding. The problem is compounded with the advent of software bidding agents. 
Software bidding agents are used to bid on a human's behalf. The Artificial Intelligence community has 
suggested that agent-based negotiation could eventually replace all human input. However, such a claim 
is fla.·wed, as agents can also ad in a fraudulent manner. '\iVhile much research has been conducted into 
improving the performance of bidding agents, little attention has been given to the security implications. 
A bidding agent can be designed maliciously so that it harms the anction in some of the previously 
mentioned ways. This is a seriowl concern now that bidding agents are used for trading shares online. 
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Online share trading is a popular offshoot of more conventional online auctions. An individual can 
submit a buy or sell order to a broker, who then enters it into the share market. The privacy and security 
issues in online auctions are also manifest in online share trading. Although tightly regulated, there is even 
less security than online auctions. The extra parties involved in the auctioning process (Le., broker, share 
market., regulat.ory authority, etc.) further complicate the privacy and security requirements. Limited 
attention has been paid to these issues, or the special auction type employed by this application. 
There are many auction types including Vickrey, Dutch, Japanese, Combinatorial, etc. Existing 
auction security literature has mainly concentrated on Vickrey or sealed bid auctions. However, the most 
popular online auction type employed online resembles an English auction (e.g., eBay). In an English 
auction, one seller offers an item to several bidders where the highest price ,,,ins. In contrast, online 
share trading uses an auction type referred to as a Continuous Double A7tction (CDA). A CDA has many 
buyers and sellers continually trading a commodity. The method for matching buy and sell bids (referred 
to as clearing) is much more sophisticated than English auctions. The privacy and security requirements 
for English auctions and CDAs differ dramatically from previously studied auction t.ypes. This book 
concent.rates solely on English auctions and CDAs. 
1.1 Aims 
This book investigates privacy, security and fraud issues in online English and Continuous Double auc-
tions. The l1.min objective is to understand the characteristics of fraudulent. auction behaviour, and 
propose mechanisms to combat it. vVith regard to the aforementioned problems, t.he research goals 
include: 
1. Provide a security model for auctioning online that protects a bidder's personal information; 
2. Construct a model for securely and anonymously trading shares online; 
3. Explore the security implicat.ions of agent based negot.iation; 
4. Develop methods to detect certain types of auction fraud (i.e., shilling); and 
5. Devise and evaluate alternate software mechanisms for clearing CDAs. 
1.2 Methodology 
Many of the issues investigated in this book are illegal to perform in actual commercial online auctions. 
This makes it difficult. to assess the extent of fraudulent activity, and understand its nature. Furthermore, 
there is no way to evaluate the effectiveness of newly proposed security mechanisms. To accomplish the 
research goals, an online auction server has been constructed. This allows for experimentation in a 
controlled enviromnent, without the risk of prosecution. 
The server was llsed to test security theories and gauge practical performance and efficiency. The 
server can perform both simulated and rea.l auctions. It has a software bidding agent. interface, which 
allows auctions to be fully automa.ted (i.e., no human input required). The auction server's software 
components are documented throughout the book. Descriptions are given regarding how tests were con-
ducted, and their results. 
This book does not condone the use of any of the discussed illegal themes, and does not 
support in any way their use other than for the purpose of research, and only then to assist 
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in the development of effective avoidance, deterrent and detection mechanisms to use to 
stop fraudulent behaviour. 
1.3 Results 
\iVith regard to the aims stated in Section 1.1, the book results are as follows: 
1) Online auction privacy and security issues have been extensively investigated.fl:om this, a com-
plete online auction security model for English auctions has been devised. This model uses cryptographic 
mechanisms to ensure bid authenticity, and provides verification t.hat. everyone has followed the auc-
tion prot.ocol correctly. An individual remains anonymous provided they don't repudiate having made 
a bid. In the event of bid repudiation, t\vo independent parties can work together to trace the bid's owner. 
2) Privacy and security issues involved in online share trading are investigated, and a comprehensive 
set of security requirements are given for tIllS auction type (i.e., CDAs). The online English auction 
security model is extended to encompass CDAs and application specific details pertinent to online share 
trading. This is the first secure auction scheme to specifically address share markets. 
3) Two malicious bidding agents that engage in shilling behaviour have been constructed. A simple 
shill bidding agent inserts fake bids to inflate the price until it becomes too risky to continue. A adaptive 
sh'ill agent uses knowledge from a series of auctions with substitutable items to revise its strategy. This 
is achieved using novel prediction methods. The agents allow us to understand a fraudulent bidder's 
nature, and help refine the proposed shill deteetion techniques. 
4) A novel method to detect shill bidding in online English auctions is presented. Bidders are issued 
with a score based on their bidding behaviour. The score indicates the likelihood that the bidder is 
engaging in shilling. This can be used by other bidders to decide whether they want to participate in 
auctions held by a particular seller. The scheme is resilient in that it can detect colluding bidders and 
sellers that attempt to thwart the system. 
5) Several new CDA market dearing algorithms are proposed, which are more efficient than the exist-
ing methods used in financial markets. These algorithms employ techniques such as waiting, subsidisation 
and prioritising t.o achieve a higher trade volume. Efficiency is measured in terms of the number of bids 
and amount of quantity matched. Comparisons are drawn between the optimal offline algorithm and the 
proposed online clearing algorithms. 
As previously mentioned, the performance of the devised techniques has been tested using the online 
auction server. Test results are given and scrutinised in terms of existing literature. Many of the results 
can be practically applied in commercial online auctions. 
1.4 Book Organisation 
This book draws from e-Commerce, Information Security, Software Engineering and Artificial Intelligence. 
This book is organised as follows. Chapter 2 introduces online auction concepts. It provides an 
overview of auction history, the types of auctions that exist, and the major commercial vendors in the 
online auction market. Chapter 3 discusses fraudulent bidding behaviour and the security and anonymity 
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problems with auctioning online. This chapter is the main thrust behind the security considerations of 
the research presented in this book. The software platform for conducting online English auctions and 
CDAs is introduced in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents an online English auction security model that 
seeks to remedy the identified privacy and security concerns. Chapter 6 discusses online share trading, 
and its similarities to online auctions in terms of privacy and security. An anonymous and secure CDA 
scheme for trading shares online is presented. Chapter 7 explores the security implications for agent-
based negotiation, and presents bidding agents that bid in a fraudulent manner. Chapter 8 presents 
novel methods to detect shill bidding. Chapter 9 provides some concluding remarks and avenues for 
future work. Appendix A contrasts several algorithms for clearing share markets (i.e., matching buy and 
sell bids). 
This book is designed to be read sequentially from start to finish, as later topics build upon previously 
introduced concepts. However, after reading Chapters 2 and 3, the reader can skip ahead if desired. 
English auctions are addressed in Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 8. CDAs are covered in Chapters 4, 6 and 
Appendix A. Note that Chapters 5 and 6 require that the reader has some background cryptographic 
knowledge as they contain complicated theoretical mathematics. 
